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Offscreen Space 
From Cinema and Sculpture to Photography, Poetry, and Narrative 
 
 
Thomas Harrison 
 
 
This essay aims to explore formal limits of artistic idioms and some manners in which they are 
put to positive semantic use. With the help of a term borrowed from film studies, I will argue that 
many, if not most, artworks activate relations between spaces directly embodied by their signs 
(recognizable shapes in the visual arts, for example, or words in written texts) and spaces 
indirectly conveyed by contexts, associations, or imaginings produced outside the borders of 
those perceptible forms in the mind of a reader or spectator. Aspects of offscreen space are 
marked by the visual, aural, or conceptual perimeters of what a work actually presents onscreen, 
amplifying its voice or points of reference and occasionally even making the work seem 
somewhat partial or incomplete.1 More concrete offscreen spaces pertain to the cultures of a 
work’s production and reception, subject to variable methodologies of interpretation. In both 
cases, components of a work’s meaning are construed to lie outside its formal articulation, 
beyond its explicitly pictured purview, in questions or matters that it conjures up. Some aspects 
of the off seem primarily semiotic in nature, involving connotations or lacunae in the work’s 
conventions or system of signs; others appear to be functions of the material and cultural humus 
from which and to which a work is addressed. Either way, the offscreen spaces activated by a 
work of art are as constructive of the significance we attribute to it as the lines and tones and 
colors and words of which it is composed. Formalist criticism generally concerns itself with the 
onscreen logic of signs qua signs; historicist criticism is more attuned to the signs’ offscreen 
implications—in its world of reference. My own intention lies in between these two—in the co-
implications of on and off space of those systems of signs, and particularly in the cognitive-
semiotic play they activate, whether in poetry or film, sculpture or narrative fiction. 
Configurations and conventions of offscreen space vary greatly from one period and artistic style 
to another. A trans-medial study of the sort I propose in this short essay is subject to its own 
formal limitations; it must overlook nuances in the nature of the arts and the cultures by which 
they are transmitted and circulated. Realism, to take just one example, is less interested in a 
particular off than symbolism, using signs in a less formally charged way.  Even so, by beginning 
to recognize the constitutive role of offscreen spaces in a diverse range of artistic examples, we 
can put ourselves in a position to appreciate the noetic reach of art at large, better assessing the 
roles of signs in the texts they shape and of the texts in the cultures on which they act. I begin on 
the cusp of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries and focus most of my attention on the twentieth. 
 
I. An improbable illustration of offscreen space can be drawn from the highest canons of 
Western art—“improbable” because we are speaking of that veritable epitome of self-contained, 
artistic embodiment which is solid, three-dimensional, Renaissance sculpture. 
 
                                                
1 Indeed, in a work calling on some of the same case studies, I propose that offscreen space represents one of four 
modalities in a rhetoric of aesthetic incompletion: Thomas Harrison, L’arte dell’incompiuto (Rome: Castelvecchio, 
2017). 
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Fig. 1. Michelangelo, David, marble, 1501–04, Galleria dell’Accademia, Florence. 
 
Michelangelo’s corporeal depiction of this David (Fig. 1) is so stunningly lifelike that it is 
difficult to think of anything outside its amassment of physical beauty and power. Indeed, it is 
difficult to know how many contemporary viewers even reflect on who that legendary David was 
in experiencing this statue. Eventually, however, the realization must dawn on many that a 
crucial component of the marmoreal representation lies beyond it—in that invisible space toward 
which David directs his energies: the space of the missing Goliath. This space is not only that of 
a missing contemporaneous circumstance, but also that of an immaterial representation of a time 
to come—the imminent moment of the battle, of David’s appointment with destiny. For all its 
intensive compactness, Michelangelo’s work is distended spatially into what is not materially 
represented, and temporally into what stands on the verge of happening. The David calls 
something to mind that is not figured, creating a drama that is missing in the prior sculptural 
treatments of the topic in models which were obviously present to Michelangelo’s mind: those of 
Donatello and Verrocchio (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Donatello, David, bronze, c. 1430s–40s, and Verrocchio, David, bronze, 1473–75, both in the Museo 
Nazionale del Bargello, Florence. 
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Precisely because these Davids include the giant in the representation, they lack the tension of 
Michelangelo’s statue. Positioning Goliath’s severed head at David’s feet, they complete the 
story, announcing a finality resolved in time. They show what Michelangelo obliges us to 
imagine, compels us to recreate. The later sculptor produces an offscreen space within the frame 
of his imposing but vulnerable body.  
The effects of its extended space are furrowed deep into David’s brow and apprehensive 
eyes (Fig. 3). They are recorded in anxiety, fear, and self-doubt, strangled by resolve and 
courage.  
  
 
Fig. 3. Michelangelo, David (detail), marble, 1501–04, Galleria dell’Accademia, Florence. 
 
The poise of this body is offset by a spiritual tension and process of deliberation. One can hardly 
imagine a statue so little self-contained as this self-affirmative figure of Michelangelo’s.  
Republican Florentines at the very beginning of the 1500s would have found this sculpture 
bringing additional offscreen material to their attention: the intuition that the looming, invisible 
Goliath was metaphorical of the threat of political tyranny, which Tuscan Republicans feared 
more than they loathed; that the vulnerable Florence had to defend its autonomy from the 
monstrous powers of Milan and of Charles VIII, perhaps even the Medici. None of this needed to 
be brought explicitly onscreen in Michelangelo’s statue of the young liberator.  
But Michelangelo’s genius looks further than these historical contexts and figurative 
analogies. It envisions—or makes us envision—something else unsaid, or only implied, in its 
representation. This work explores another battle not confined to Michelangelo’s place and 
moment in time—the battle of a young spirit within its material body, a battle waged between 
outer and inner forces, between the seen and its unseen outcome, between an objective 
circumstance and its subjective pressures, between the embodied and the merely imagined, 
between the clarity of the now and an unreadable future. David’s eloquent physical reality is 
engulfed by an immaterial, wordless one. This wordless one, too, is also divided between faith in 
divine backing and an inability to know how well placed that faith is. David’s gaze penetrates so 
far into the unknown that, as Erich Heller has argued in a classic but little visited essay, it 
prefigures dissociations in human comprehension which will come to fruition one hundred years 
later in Shakespeare’s Hamlet (1599–1602) and Cervantes’ Don Quixote (1605–15).2 For Heller, 
                                                
2 Heller’s essay is called “The Artist’s Journey into the Interior: A Hegelian Prophecy and Its Fulfillment,” in The 
Artist’s Journey into the Interior and Other Essays (New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1965), pp. 
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Michelangelo’s David marks a paradigmatic moment in a progression leading straight to the 
deep, romantic excavations of individual, subjective interiority in the nineteenth century. 
 
II. Michelangelo’s David is a signal example of the incorporation of offscreen space into what 
otherwise appears to be a perfectly self-contained representation. It prefigures a strategy that 
cinema will later activate through an art of multiple and moving images, each of which, through 
the help of others, suggests something more than itself. What is onscreen in a film is what the 
camera visualizes for the viewer within its frame. The offscreen, instead, entails actions and 
spaces that a viewer imagines or adds to a cinematic frame to fill out its significance. An art of 
montage, stitching one shot together with others to form a story, cinema relies heavily on the 
figure of synecdoche: it uses bordered, rectangular images to suggest settings surrounding the 
frame. Unlike an isolated image or ensemble of images in traditional painting, firmly enclosed 
within the single plane of a painted surface, a cinematic image is perceived to overflow those 
limits, extending into the spaces around its border.3 The dramatic action of cinema invokes a 
continuum (and occasionally pointed discontinuities) extending from what we see on the screen 
to circumambient spaces, providing in flat two-dimensional pictures an illusion of temporal and 
spatial amplitude. 
There are potentially four dimensions to the offscreen space of a cinematic image, 
amplifying its synchronous, present-amplifying diegesis. One lies to its left, one to the right, 
another above it, and another below it (Fig.4).4 
 
 
Fig. 4. The Four Dimensions of Offscreen Space (Image by author).  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
99–170. The link to Shakespeare gives me occasion to reference a rich and rewarding new study of offscreen space 
which takes precisely Hamlet—the “haunting” of this young Dane by an invisible ghost—as representative of the 
same on and offscreen dynamic that I am exploring in this study. Eyal Peretz’s The Off-Screen: An Investigation of 
the Cinematic Frame (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2017) consists of a detailed reading and highly informed 
theoretical discussion of inscribed absences in the films of Tarkovsky, Hawkes, Griffith, Chaplin, Riefenstahl, 
Tarantino, and Lang, as well in the different media of Rembrandt, Bruegel, and Shakespeare. Peretz’s work is highly 
consonant with mine, and I regret having discovered it too late to engage its claims directly.  
3 André Bazin, an early theorizer of cinematic offscreen space, contrasted its frames precisely with those of painting: 
“The picture frame […] is centripetal, the screen centrifugal.” (André Bazin, “Painting and Cinema,” in What Is 
Cinema? trans. Hugh Gray [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967], 1:165). 
4 All diagrams in this essay are by the author. 
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These are areas into which the screen action can spill, not only through characters’ motions in 
and out of the frame of the image, but even through the positioning of images within a frame’s 
static representation. For example, when we see just the legs of someone sitting in a chair at the 
edge of the left frame, we construe the remainder of the body to lie offscreen.  
Given that the cinematic image is meant to give an impression of three-dimensionality, the 
screen picture is really read as a rectangular prism or cuboid, and this implies the presence of two 
additional offscreen spaces. One is construed behind the image, as when a character exits a door 
at the back of the scene; another lies in front of the image and can be brought into play by a 
character looking or speaking past the position of the camera, towards a person we cannot see 
but imagine standing in front of the scene before us.5 A two-dimensional rectangular film image 
thus operates in the manner of a cuboid located within a larger, implied, offscreen cuboid or 
amorphous space invoked by the spilling over of screen action beyond the frame (Fig. 5). 
 
 
Fig. 5. The Cuboid of Offscreen Space (Image by author).  
 
Outside that cuboid there is an additional offscreen space which conventional cinematic 
representation usually lets us forget as we enjoy the spectacle, and this is the space of the 
spectator. That space is breached by penetrating the front wall of that larger cuboid, as when, in a 
Brechtian alienation effect, a character in the film speaks explicitly to someone in the audience 
(the narrative of Ettore Scola’s C’eravamo tanto amati, 1974, is constructed this way, with 
onscreen addresses to the viewer, and with its breaking of the “fourth wall” amply prepared for 
by the experimental techniques of the French New Wave of the late Fifties and Sixties).6 Within 
the Italian tradition, Bernardo Bertolucci is occasionally given to breaking that wall in his films’ 
final scenes. The very last shot in The Conformist (1970) shows the protagonist staring straight 
into the audience’s eye.7 Two years later, as Marlon Brando’s character dies on the terrace in 
Last Tango in Paris,8 the camera recording the scene captures a reflection of Bertolucci’s 
soundman in the French doors. On the occasion of a master class held at the University of 
                                                
5 The definitive discussion of the six visually implied offscreen spaces lies in Noël Burch, Theory of Film Practice, 
trans. Helen R. Lane (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973). Similar later analyses can be found in Francesco Casetti 
and Federico di Chio, Analisi del film (Milan: Bompiani, 1990), 130–34; David Bordwell, Narration in the Fiction 
Film (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 119–30; Jacques Aumont, et al, Aesthetics of Film, trans. and 
rev. Richard Neupert (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1992), 10–18. 
6 C’eravamo tanto amati, directed by Ettore Scola, 1974. 
7 The Conformist, directed by Bernardo Bertolucci, 1970.   
8 Last Tango in Paris, directed by Bernardo Bertolucci, 1972. 
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California, Los Angeles on November 12, 2013, Bertolucci claimed to have selected this take of 
the scene precisely on account of its “flaw”: it offered a playful opportunity to bring something 
onscreen which is normally left off: the production apparatus, the mechanics of the film’s 
making, the “modernist” gesture, again in keeping with a New Wave aesthetics, of commenting 
on the artwork. 
The reverse procedure has an analogous effect, raising the question of what we 
conventionally expect from onscreen presentation. It occurs when the sight of something 
important is obstructed. In The Conformist, Manganiello sits on a bench in a park as he speaks to 
an offscreen Marcello. The camera conspicuously moves in such a way as to have the camera’s 
sight of Manganiello hidden by a tree—perhaps like Marcello, who at that moment wishes to 
block him out? Sometimes there are thematically compelling reasons for rendering an onscreen 
action “off.” At the end of Sofia Coppola’s Lost in Translation (2003),9 the entire denouement of 
the film—which the audience expects to transpire in the final, emotional exchange between the 
two main characters—is kept out of our hearing by the interference of traffic and circumambient 
noise. Here, the off-on-screen action, if one can put it in those terms, is due to the absence of its 
audial signifier, in a strategy which had been asserted by auteurist films of the 1960s. 
Michelangelo Antonioni’s L’avventura (1960) has an important conversation between police 
investigating the disappearance of Anna and her father drowned out by the buzzing blades of a 
helicopter.10  
 
 
Fig. 6. Circumambient Narrative Space (Image by Author). 
 
 
III. Not all film activates complex dynamics between on and offscreen space to the point of 
rendering something onscreen “off.” Only exceptionally does it turn cognitive and perceptual 
dissonance into a structural principle; its “institutional mode of representation,” as Noël Burch 
calls it,11 goes out of its way to do the opposite, minimizing the tensions between the seen and 
the unseen, and between the space of the film’s diegesis and that of its processing audience. In 
the very infancy of film, around 1910, Hollywood production companies even published 
directives enjoining actors never to look directly into the camera in order not to make members 
of the audience feel that they were not safely outside the story. The only conventionally 
                                                
9 Lost in Translation, directed by Sofia Coppola, 2003. 
10 L’avventura, directed by Michelangelo Antonioni, 1960. The specialist of offscreen acoustic effects in cinema—
which can create even more illusions of the off than visual signifiers, supplementing the scene with sounds issuing 
from out-of-frame events or “cancelling” part of the visual diegesis, as in the above examples from Coppola and 
Antonioni—is Michel Chion. See his The Voice in Cinema, ed. and trans. Claudia Gorbman (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999).  
11 Noël Burch, Life to Those Shadows, trans. Ben Brewster (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1990), 7. 
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acceptable offscreen space was that of the story’s own world of narrative events, which the 
screen needed not only to establish but also to absorb and incorporate by allowing its mise-en-
scène to reach out into a fictional circumambient space. In this diagram (Fig. 6), the classical 
cinematic shot is figured as penetrating the spaces surrounding it. A richly signifying mise-en- 
scène enhances precisely those actions, statements, and gestures, turning the cuboid-impression 
of the screen into the synecdoche of a larger, living cuboid. As a matter of fact, spectators of a 
film should not be left with the impression of a “cuboid” at all; the borders of the conventional 
screen image should not be felt. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Aldo Rossi, untitled and undated (probably the City Hall of Borgoricco). Image from Luigi Ghirri, Aldo 
Rossi: Things Which Are Only Themselves, ed. by Paola Costantini (Montréal:  CCA; Milan: Electa, 1996), 78. 
 
The presence and operation of offscreen space is most appreciated when this principle is 
contravened. That is the case where, instead of reaching into surrounding space in a centrifugal 
way, an image makes an issue of its own distinction. This is easy to experience in the single, 
static image of a photograph. A polaroid by Aldo Rossi, included in a “requiem” portfolio 
dedicated to his “lost friend” Luigi Ghirri, plays on this effect by truncating a tower in a manner 
that makes it impossible to know to which factory or space it belongs (Fig. 7). With the 
exclusion of this tower’s time, context, and function, what lies outside the frame of the photo 
becomes a palpable absence. The offscreen becomes the issue itself in this kind of work. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Luigi Ghirri, Cemetery of San Cataldo, Modena; The Great Arcade, 1987. Image from Luigi Ghirri, Aldo 
Rossi: Things Which Are Only Themselves, ed. by Paola Costantini (Montréal:  CCA; Milan: Electa, 1996), 44. 
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Luigi Ghirri himself engages in the same operation by taking an ostensibly functional 
structure and transforming it into an abstract, flattened composition (Fig. 8). Aside from 
alienating its subject matter, the image is formally complete. The perspective on the building’s 
beams is perfectly centered, transmitting symmetrical shadows. The three horizontal segments of 
the picture are equally proportioned. The middle segment subdivides again into two, one 
illuminated, one in the shadows. The image is also vertically divided, mathematically. The effect 
is centripetal rather than centrifugal, not alluding to something outside the image in the manner 
of the picture of the tower. Instead, but this is part of the same problem, this photo figures its 
offscreen space onscreen—for nothing whatsoever is happening here. One feels the scene’s 
missing “action.”  
In this way, places are presented as pure settings. Ghirri offers a scene but bans its dramatic 
development. Divesting it of its narrative substance, he excludes the context-providing signifiers 
that classical photography more often tries to include in its shots. Even when the image does 
contain a center of dramatic interest, as in the following photograph (Fig. 9), the information that 
might ground its significance is left offscreen, engulfed in darkness. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Luigi Ghirri, Porto Recanati, 1984. Image from Luigi Ghirri,  
Paesaggio Italian/Italian Landscape (Milan: Electa, 1989), 97. 
 
These images disrupt a classical negotiation of on and offscreen in cinema and photography in 
which what we see either raises no question of what is happening outside it or evokes that 
outside in the manner of a consubstantial extension.  
 
IV. The offscreen extensions of film are no less temporal than spatial. In the interest of dramatic 
emphasis or narrative economy, a cinematic plot deliberately excludes relevant events. It may 
allude to them in what it shows (as when a fade out on a kiss implies erotic development, or 
when an act of murder is not explicitly shown), or it may try to shield missing information from 
our attention altogether. Whether suggested or passed over in silence, the discrepancy between 
on and offscreen events is not usually made contentious. Linked in basic continuity, the 
representational features of the work are made to seem complete.  
When Michelangelo Antonioni performs the equivalent of Ghirri’s photographs in his early 
films of the ’60s—unfolding dead time or showing nothing that is palpably happening—he 
makes us question what can and cannot be brought into a film, whether its images should serve 
narrative explication or rather operate only in the manner of a screen: an observable but not fully 
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divulging surface. Glossed by Lorenzo Cuccu,12 the result brings to mind the ontologically 
constitutive role of vision, or the agency of the camera-eye. This role of vision and 
understanding is powerfully served by the contrast between on and offscreen space. 
One sequence among many renders the idea. The film L’avventura is all about the 
infringements of an unavailable, offscreen, diegetic development on the immediate concerns of 
its characters. Anna, a friend of Sandro and Claudio, whose intimate avventura the film recounts, 
literally disappears on an island.  Her absence proceeds to haunt each one of the two characters’ 
acts for the rest of the film. One sequence in their search for Anna begins the morning after 
Claudia and Sandro spend the night in a shack on the island where she went missing. The first 
shot outside of the shack shows a view down onto waves breaking onto a rock in the sea. Slowly 
the camera pans left, tilting up along the shoreline, in what gives the impression of a point-of-
view shot. There is nothing of dramatic interest in this shot, and yet it conveys the feeling of a 
dramatic offscreen presence, of a subjectivity behind the camera. Surprisingly, however, as the 
camera reveals previously unseen aspects of the landscape, it comes to frame Sandro, seated in 
profile and gazing offscreen right into the sea we had been observing. The sequence subverts the 
conventional order of subjective observation in cinema by way of eyeline-match editing, which 
first gives us a character and then a record of what he or she is looking at. Here the process is 
reversed: the camera movement gives a sense of subjective looking preceding the introduction of 
a character. That looking is abstracted and separated from Sandro; it is retroactively associated 
by the spectator with an anonymous and disembodied outside eye. 
The camera rests on Sandro, apparently absorbed by the thought of the absent Anna, who is 
metaphorically identified with offscreen space throughout the film (like the lost Irma in 
Antonioni’s earlier feature, Il grido, 1957).13 Suddenly Sandro turns to the opposite direction, 
seeing something offscreen left and getting up to move into that direction. Another figure enters 
the frame from the left—another offscreen presence and woman—not Anna, but Claudia. To 
reinforce the tension of these eccentric forces on Sandro, Antonioni cuts to a shot taken from the 
other side of Sandro and Claudia, crossing the famous 180° line of cinematic perspective. This 
reverses Sandro’s position, showing him in extreme close up staring towards an offscreen 
Claudia at frame right. This disorientation of vectors doubles the experience of absence, making 
us wonder how Sandro is registering the effects of these women. 
Sandro and Claudia speak as each gazes out of the frame in different directions. Their 
conversation is then interrupted by the sound of a boat which cannot be seen. The camera scans 
seeking it, but the boat remains invisible. Returning to frame Sandro and Claudia in a two-shot, 
the camera then shows us an empty landscape which again seems to be a point-of-view shot of 
the characters scouring the island, but again we are mistaken. The characters are not seeing this 
scene, for Claudia steps into its frame and Sandro soon appears in its background. Like the initial 
shot of the sequence, this one too presents a pseudo-subjective visualized scene before a 
character enters to seek what he or she fails to find. The motif is that of attempting to gain one’s 
bearings in the space we are given, which Claudia and Sandro enter and exit in the most 
awkward and conspicuous of ways.  
This may be the type of filmic technique that inspired philosopher Stanley Cavell’s intuition 
that the experience of a screen is always an experience of displacement—transposing the 
                                                
12 Lorenzo Cuccu, La visione come problema. Forme e svolgimento del cinema di Antonioni (Rome: Bulzoni, 1973). 
13 Il grido, directed by Michelangelo Antonioni, 1957. On Il grido and Antonioni’s articulations of space more 
generally, see Thomas Harrison and Sarah Carey, “The World Outside the Window: Antonioni’s Architectonics of 
Space and Time,” Italian Culture 29/1 (2011): 37–51. 
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filmgoer’s attention from his or her everyday life to the life represented on that screen—a 
displacement which films generally make appear as our natural condition.14 That is to say, 
cinema displaces our gaze but normally makes that displacement appear natural. Antonioni does 
not merely thematize this displacement in stories of disoriented human behavior; he 
denaturalizes it and transfers it onto his audience. He makes the screen itself a cipher of the 
offscreen, of that Umwelt in which we, the players of our lives, attempt to establish our bearings. 
 
V. In cinema, photography, and sculpture, Antonioni, Ghirri, and Michelangelo give iconic shape 
to a spatio-temporal frame in which characters assume a position. Literature has the advantage of 
being able to illuminate that frame theoretically. A poem like “L’infinito” by Giacomo Leopardi 
even suggests that this nexus between on and offscreen realities constitutes a primal scene of 
human thought: 
 
Sempre caro mi fu quest’ermo colle, 
E questa siepe, che da tanta parte  
Dell’ultimo orizzonte il guardo esclude. 
Ma sedendo e mirando, interminati 
spazi di là da quella, e sovrumani  
silenzi, e profondissima quiete  
io nel pensier mi fingo; ove per poco 
il cor non si spaura.14 
 
[It was always dear to me, this solitary hill, and this hedge which shuts off the gaze from 
so large a part of the uttermost horizon. But sitting and looking out, in thought I fashion 
for myself endless spaces beyond, more-than-human silences, and deepest quiet; where 
the heart is all but terrified.]  
 
Leopardi’s siepe invokes that other meaning of screen, which is embedded in the Italian 
word schermo: a structure shielding the sight of something else. This particular screen behind 
which the poet sits, this hedge on the hill, instead of giving something to be seen, as in the 
movies, brackets off the circumambient landscape. It produces an offscreen experience within 
the present. By not allowing for a continuous vision from the hill onto the furthest horizon, it 
makes what is not contained in the horizon come forcibly to mind. 
Leopardi intends this hedged enclosure to allude to the conditions enabling poetic 
contemplation. Vague, indefinable notions flood in on the seated poet on account of his inability 
to see outside a circumscribed frame: unbordered intuitions, interminable spaces and superhuman 
silences. Precisely because this hedge interrupts a continuum that would otherwise extend 
naturally out onto the horizon, the here and now spills over into interminati spazi di là da 
quella—spaces beyond, not only this enclosure, but the historical horizon in which it lies (Fig. 
10). 
 
                                                
14 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film (New York: Viking, 1971), as cited in 
Film Theory: Introductory Readings, ed. Leo Baudry and Marshall Cohen (New York, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999), 344.  
15 Giacomo Leopardi, “L’infinito,” in Canti, ed. Niccolò Gallo and Cesare Gàrboli (Turin: Einaudi, 1974), 105–06, 
vv. 1–8. Translation by the author. 
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Fig. 10. From Enclosure to Historical Horizon and Beyond (Image by Author). 
 
The specificity and delimitation of the onscreen scene (on the near side of the hedge) evokes 
offscreen ideas eluding all shape and form, a sea of immensity engulfing the specificities of 
thought. “L’infinito” suggests that just such a space, detached from its consubstantial 
surroundings, is the place of poetry, articulating the recesses circumscribing—but lacking 
expression in—the here and now. 
Only a restricting enclosure makes the measureless topics of poetry accessible: this is the 
paradox of the poem. Yet these measureless topics of poetry are immanently inscribed in the 
finite arena that seems to exclude them, for it is only they—the indistinguishable “elsewheres” of 
verses 4–7—that enable the poet to take stock of where he actually is. The offscreen space of 
which he becomes aware establishes the grounds for a relationship, a comparison (vo 
comparando) between the infinite silence and the sound of the wind now rushing through the 
plants. 
 
… E come il vento 
odo stormir tra queste piante, io quello 
infinito silenzio a questa voce 
vo comparando: e mi sovvien l’eterno, 
e le morte stagioni, e la presente 
e viva, e il suon di lei. Così tra questa 
immensità s’annega il pensier mio: 
e il naufragar m’è dolce in questo mare.15  
 
[And as I hear the wind rustling among these plants, I go on and compare this voice 
to that infinite silence: and I recall the eternal, and the dead seasons, and the present, 
living one and her sound. So in this immensity my thoughts drown: and shipwreck is 
sweet to me in this sea.] 
 
Thanks to the formless transcendence of time and space, the poet is able to actually register the 
sound of the season he currently occupies (la presente e viva, e il suon di lei). 
In an initial schematization, the ontological distinction would seem to suggest a split screen 
conjoining the timeless dead seasons to the one present and alive (Fig. 11). 
 
                                                
16 Leopardi, “L’infinito,” vv. 8–15. 
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Fig. 11. The Split Screen of L’infinito (Image by Author). 
 
But this is too Parmenidean, too Platonic, a scheme—as though true, sublime Being were one 
thing, and the particulars of the here and now another. In Leopardi, the relationship is more 
dynamically interrelated. The scene of the hill-and-hedge is, to begin with, engulfed by formless 
infinity, of which it is no more than a part (Fig. 12). 
 
Fig. 12. The Engulfed Siepe (Image by Author). 
 
In addition, only out of the inner, circumscribed place do the interminable spaces of engulfment 
open up, as though through a window or hole looking out:  
 
Fig. 13. Looking Into the Spaces of Engulfment (Image by Author). 
 
This epistemology of the poem, so to speak, owes its genesis to an encounter between on 
and offscreen spaces, each revealed as enmeshed with the other, components of a single picture. 
That is why the many thises and thats originally particularizing the poet’s concrete setting 
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(quest’ermo colle, questa siepe, quella, queste piante, questa voce) transcend their locality to 
indicate ideas offscreen to their purview (quello infinito silenzio, questa immensità, questo 
mare), pointing to a formless infinity in which everyday thought drowns. Thus Leopardi circles 
the square. 
This relationship between the on and the off is consistent with literary theory crystalized by 
the Russian formalists, if not already the romantics, according to which poetry articulates 
imaginative visions literally off limits to the self-evident referents of everyday prose.16 In that 
view, poetic language shapes meanings absent from the screens of ordinary language. The poet 
goes linguistically offscreen in order to bring more indeterminate significance on, coercing it into 
language. The expressive capacities of our common conceptions are thereby enriched, their 
screens yoked to what lies off and what is not ordinarily ordered upon them. 
 
VI. Can prose fiction do something similar? In a style that has become normative since the 
nineteenth-century realist novel, narrative reaches into the offscreen spaces of history as though 
they were not fundamentally discontinuous with the represented world of the fiction. It also takes 
account of the fictional offscreen syntagmatically, in a manner also practiced by classical cinema 
(cultivating ellipsis, narrative suspense, and montage construction).17 In the novel, another 
offscreen space is often embodied by storytellers, who make themselves felt, commenting on the 
action they recount, supplementing it with reflection, discursive analysis and explanation. 
Diagrammatically pictured, they give us an image of screen action permeated by an outside made 
up of authorial commentary (Fig. 14). 
  
 
Fig. 14. Narrated Action Circumscribed by Authorial Comment (Image by Author). 
                                                
17 Victor Shklovsky, “Art as Technique,” in Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays, ed. and trans. Lee T. Lemon 
and Marion J. Reis (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), 3-24. 
18 A grammar of these narrative techniques, varying from one medium to another, is provided by Seymour Chatman, 
Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1978).  
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Accordingly, at the beginning of Chapter 19 of I promessi sposi,18 Alessandro Manzoni’s 
narrator steps in to comment on the dramatic interaction between the honorable count and Father 
Provincial: 
  
  
Fig. 15. Diagram of the Narrator’s Intervention (Image by Author). 
 
While this may be normative practice for many types of novel (and received many of its 
most interesting elaborations in the eighteenth century), it is no less true, as Walter Benjamin 
contends, that it is “half the art of storytelling to keep a story free from explanation.” 19 The very 
substance of the heard tale—its ultimate noetic content—is “intelligence coming from afar,”20 
bringing something out-of-reach of everyday experience to the mind of its auditors. By 
recommending that the narrator not explain or elucidate this exotic information, Benjamin 
stresses the interest of its offscreen implications. The listener of the story recognizes: something 
in this order of events is evading my comprehension. 
In the Italian twentieth century, conspicuous techniques of non-explanation were devised by 
Tommaso Landolfi, Alberto Savinio, Antonio Delfini, and Anna Maria Ortese. Benjamin’s 
lessons were also fully assimilated by one of Italy’s most effective narrators today, Gianni Celati. 
One of his stories is about a man called Baratto who, in the tradition of Melville’s Bartleby, and 
for reasons never properly explained, decides one day to quit speaking. The story is all composed 
                                                
19 Alessandro Manzoni, I promessi sposi, ed. Tommaso Di Salvo (1827; repr. Bologna: Zanichelli, 1987), 385. The 
English translation reads as follows: “Anyone who saw a weed—a fine sorrel, for instance—growing in an untilled 
field, and really wanted to know if it came from a seed ripened in the field itself, or from a seed borne there by the 
wind, or dropped by a bird, would never come to any conclusion, however long he pondered over the matter. So we, 
too, cannot tell if the old count’s decision to make use of the Father Provincial to cut the tangled knot in the most 
satisfactory way sprang naturally from his own brain, or from Attilio’s insinuation.” The English translation, slightly 
revised, is from Manzoni, The Betrothed, trans. Archibald Colquhoun (New York: Dutton, 1968), 255. 
20 Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller,” in Illuminations: Essays and Reflections, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry 
Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), 89. 
21 Ibid. 
 15 
of descriptions like the following, where the mute man steps into his apartment one evening and 
closes the door:  
 
Il tavolo del soggiorno è apparecchiato, l’apparecchia ogni giorno sua moglie 
prima di uscire. Negli ultimi tempi sua moglie torna tardi alla sera e forse ha un 
altro uomo, ma Baratto non glielo ha chiesto perché la cosa non gli interessa. Lui 
ogni sera prepara il cibo e lo mangia in piedi nel cucinotto, e prima di andare a 
letto sparecchia la tavola perché sua moglie non creda sia successo qualcosa di 
insolito.22  
 
[The table in the living room is set, his wife sets it every day before going out. 
Lately his wife has been coming back late in the evening and maybe has another 
man, but Baratto hasn’t asked her because it doesn’t interest him. Every evening 
he prepares the food and eats standing in the little kitchen, and before going to 
bed clears the table so that his wife won’t think something odd has happened.]23 
 
But of course, something odd has happened, and happens at every turn of Celati’s narratives 
(even when the character acts in order that nothing odd, or insolito, should strike the eye). Yet 
the narrator presents these events to the reader with virtually no comment, as though the logic of 
their turns were clear and perfectly normal. Is Baratto really not interested in whether his wife 
has another man? Why not? The story makes us want to know but gives no indication. It opens 
up a space for hermeneusis, calling for interpretation. 
In Benjamin’s view, stories kept free from explanation achieve an amplitude that 
information of the type given in news reporting, aiming at full clarification, lacks. Information 
tolerates no offscreen space; it “phagocytizes” that space, streaming out into and consuming it. 
Philosophy does something analogous, unless it is exceptionally gnomic; it aims at a complete 
deployment of understanding, furnishing offscreen reasons for the on. Celati, like his friend 
Ghirri, transmits offscreen space by not configuring it, refusing to provide facts with deep or 
latent meanings. The reader is kept firmly outside the text, in the offscreen space of reading, 
dislocated as from a film that does not draw us fully into its diegesis. The story is a veil stretched 
over a hole.  
According to certain Celatian characters, this approaches something like the final function 
of words. A young woman in the third story of Quattro novelle sulle apparenze has the 
impression that written words are “come voci che spuntavano da una porta che si apriva sulle 
tenebre” [“like voices emerging from a door opened on to the darkness”] (80). It is as when 
certain streets, houses, and shadows “vogliono dire per noi chissà cosa” [“mean something or 
other”], but we cannot say what (84). Could it be, the young woman wonders, that vehicles of 
verbal meaning cause trepidation precisely “perché non sono niente” [“because they are nothing 
at all”] (84)—signs with nothing whatsoever behind them, mere surfaces, screens over nothing? 
They would be screens that you see and you see right through, to suspect at last “che il mondo 
non ha sostanza al di fuori dei racconti che ne facciamo” [“that the world has no substance 
                                                
22 Gianni Celati, “Baratto,” in Quattro novelle sulle apparenze (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1989), 11. 
23 Gianni Celati, Appearances, trans. Stuart Hood (London: Serpent’s Tail, 1991), 11. As the page numbers are 
equivalent in English and Italian, both editions will henceforth be parenthetically referenced together. 
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outside of the tales we tell of it”].24 Celati’s concretely narrated present is not perforated, like 
that of Leopardi’s poem; it is diaphanous. 
Celatian narrative surfaces are contrasted by the fixation on depth of his contemporary 
Antonio Tabucchi. Tabucchi’s narratives allude explicitly to meanings that escape the eye, 
invoking doublings and triplings of sense. The actions occurring in his stories imply others 
outside our ken, creating holes in the fabric of what is reported. Piccoli equivoci senza 
importanza,25 his most philosophical collection of stories, speaks of writing as an effort to fill 
those gaps in consciousness, dispersed as it is over the course of temporal experience, in order to 
compensate for the shortcomings of reason and causal explanation. Character after character in 
Piccoli equivoci recognizes that fundamental motivators of their behavior lie buried deep in the 
recess of their minds, in inaccessible regions of the past, in traumas, coincidences, and illegible 
mandates of fate. Offscreen spaces seem to harbor the truth of the orders in which these 
characters live. Here, too, intelligence of the scenarios comes from afar, twirling along “quella 
girandola di sotterfugi, di rimandi, di imbrogli che fu quella storia” [“the pinwheel of 
subterfuges, postponements, and confusions which go to make up the whole story”].26 
A writer a generation older than Tabucchi and Celati, Anna Maria Ortese, had a comparable 
way of accounting for the purposes and origins of narrative prose. Many of her stories, she 
claims, are efforts to convey dreams—not everyday dreams, which are “riproduttivi delle 
vicende e degli oggetti mentali” [“reproductions of mental events and objects”],27 but rather 
dreams that are “stranieri agli oggetti e alle vicende mentali” [“alien to such objects and events”], 
 
quei sogni venuti dall’esterno, il perduto all’uomo, cioè il suo passato, il tempo 
che non è più, e che pare talvolta rechino notizie di una terra ignoto, dove quell 
passato sarebbe approdato, e parrebbe aprire alla filosofia una qualche speranza di 
una realtà effettiva, che la ragione, come visto dianzi, ha recisamente negata. 
 
[dreams which come from outside, from the parts of ourselves we have lost, 
meaning our past, the time that no longer exists: dreams which sometimes seem to 
bring us news of an unknown land where that past would appear to have gone, 
thus encouraging philosophy’s hopes for a true and effective reality which reason, 
as evidence, most energetically denies.]28  
 
This contrast between a screen of comprehensible happenings and a broader, more 
perplexing backdrop calling their credibility into question is what generates the literary and 
structural tensions of her work. Her fictions seek to bring into the reader’s consciousness those 
vaguely perceived spaces to which dreams “costituiscono una specie di ponte” [“constitute a sort 
                                                
24 Celati, “Robert Walser, lezione di scandalo,” 11, as cited in Carla Benedetti, “Celati e le poetiche della grazia,” 
Rassegna europea di letteratura italiana 1 (1993): 39. 
25 Antonio Tabucchi, Piccoli equivoci senza importanza (Milan: Feltrinelli, 1985). 
26 
 Ibid., 80. The translation is from Antonio Tabucchi, Little Misunderstandings of No Importance, trans. Frances 
Frenaye (New York: New Directions, 1987), 69. 
27 Anna Maria Ortese, “Il continente sommerso,” in In sonno e in veglia (Milan: Adelphi, 1987), 115. The English is 
“The Submerged Continent,” in A Music Behind the Wall: Selected Stories, trans. Henry Martin, 2 vols. (Kingston, 
NY: McPherson & Company, 1994–98), 1:14. 
28
 Ortese, “Il continente submerso,” 121; “The Submerged Continent,” 1:21. 
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of bridge”],29 whose murmurings she seeks to make audible within the forms of everyday 
perception. 
Ortese shares that much in common with Tabucchi, but the younger writer enlists 
conceptual tools to bridge the expanse. His characters and narrators measure gaps between seen 
and unseen by way of cogitation, rumination, and conjecture—in short, by discursive 
understanding. They apply conventional processes of reflection to dimensions of experience 
outside their reach. Ortese, showing more skepticism toward conceptual thought, exits those 
frameworks to unfold her meanings. “Il continente sommerso,” from which the above quotations 
are taken, documents her mode of passage. The composition begins as an essay in empirical, 
materialist philosophy but quickly gets twisted into a fantastic account of interaction between 
living persons and immaterial, unreachable souls, contradicting the claims of the foregoing 
philosophy. As you can see, says Ortese to her reader as she makes this unorthodox move, “Io 
ragiono benissimo, ma poi, di colpo, smetto di ragionare e traggo illazioni da fatti così lievi, cari, 
deliranti, sinistri” [“I can reason quite clearly; but then, suddenly, I abandon reasoning and spin 
off speculations from such frail, cherished, delirious, and sinister facts”].30 
What often begins as a concrete exposition of an existentially recognizable here and now 
glides effortlessly into an elsewhere, into imponderable zones hovering outside the frame of 
facts. Ortese considers the border between commonsensical observation and the realms of the 
possible, fantastic, and surreal to be permeable and open to passage, which is not quite so clearly 
the case in Tabucchi. Both writers affirm a radical divergence between on and offscreen 
comprehension, but the ways in which they negotiate the divergence have little in common. The 
woman passes through walls like a phantom, the man imagines the other side without succeeding 
in breaching the barrier. Still, both bodies of work remain committed to that other side. 
When what lies on that side can be configured or represented, as in Ortese, it comes 
onscreen. Yet even this screen, like every screen, leaves something off—if only the eye, or 
camera, or the “projector” conveying the vision. Occasionally, however, even that unrepresented 
source of the vision comes into focus, as in this early poem by Eugenio Montale: 
 
Forse un mattino andando in un’aria di vetro, 
arida, rivolgendomi, vedrò compirsi il miracolo: 
il nulla alle mie spalle, il vuoto dietro 
di me, con un terrore di ubriaco. 
 
Poi come s’uno schermo, s’accamperanno di gitto 
alberi case colli per l’inganno consueto. 
Ma sarà troppo tardi; ed io me n’andrò zitto 
tra gli uomini che non si voltano, col mio segreto.31  
 
[Maybe one morning, walking in air 
of dry glass, I’ll turn and see the miracle occur— 
nothingness at my shoulders, the void 
                                                
29 Ortese, “Il continente submerso,” 115; “The Submerged Continent,” 1:21. 
30 Ortese, “Il continente submerso,” 122; “The Submerged Continent,” 1:22. 
31 Eugenio Montale, “Forse un mattina andando in un’aria di vetro,” with facing translation, in Cuttlefish Bones: 
1920–1927, trans. William Arrowsmith (New York: Norton, 1992), 66–67. 
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behind me—with a drunkard’s terror. 
 
Then, as on a screen, the usual illusion: 
hills houses trees will suddenly reassemble, 
but too late, and I’ll quietly go my way, 
with my secret, among men who don’t look back.] 
 
Montale’s poem enacts more concisely than any of the previous examples the relation 
between a perceptual scene and what it excludes. As Italo Calvino notes in his commentary on 
this poem, this may represent the first literary use in Italian of the word schermo in the cinematic 
sense of a canvas on which images are projected.32 Yet who can fail to be struck by the irony 
with which Montale uses this new art of cinema as a metaphor for non-artistic knowledge, or 
non-knowledge tout court? The hills and houses and trees that normally appear on the speaker’s 
“screen” of lived experience make up only the “usual illusion”: the canvas of common, everyday 
sight. On any particular morning, such a screen may go blank. The poet is not interested in this 
screen at all, but rather in what subtends it. At any moment he may be cast into another, 
offscreen space, detached from what stands in front of his eyes, forced to reconsider what he 
holds to be real.  
Loss of faith in the screen of everyday perception, comments Calvino, amounts to an 
experience “nè più nè meno che della irrealtà del mondo” [“neither more nor less than of the 
world’s unreality”].33 It is a Janus-faced experience that lies at the very foundation “di religioni 
filosofie letterature” [“of religion, philosophy, and literature”].34 At the moment that reality loses 
its coordinates it invites the discovery of new ones. Without explaining it in so many words, 
Montale’s poem impugns the aspiration to reaffirm the referents of quotidian awareness by way 
of a realist aesthetic. A more fundamental type of art, instead, provides a “second sight”: a 
paradoxical, miraculous glimpse of what eyes do not ordinarily look to see.35 Even so, poetry 
issuing from this other, perplexing perspective does not aim to imagine or represent an offscreen 
thought or image, no more than it settles for onscreen referents. It ultimately confronts an aporia: 
the in-credibility of every possible screen of representation. What matters now is neither the 
screen nor its potential meanings, even those not represented, but the very process of screening: 
its reasons, causes, and modes of articulation. Could this be an inevitable, dramatic historical 
conclusion to the split between the seen and unseen in Michelangelo’s David? It broadly 
coincides with the aesthetics of twentieth-century modernism. The ultimate offscreen is not what 
lies in the mind’s eye, but the eye itself, its constitution, on which meaning, disclosure, and 
revelation rely. 
 
                                                
32 Italo Calvino, “Forse un mattino,” in Letture montaliane. In occasione dell’80o compleanno del Poeta, ed. Sylvia 
Luzzatto (Genoa: Bozzi, 1977), p. 44. The English translation is provided in Montale, Cuttlefish Bones, 220.  
33 Calvino, “Forse,” 29; Cuttlefish Bones, 216. 
34 Calvino, “Forse,” 29; Cuttlefish Bones, 216.  
35 The thesis of art as a second sight is presented in Eugenio Montale, “Il fascismo e letteratura,” in Auto da fé. 
Cronache in due tempi (Milan: Il Saggiatore, 1966), 23. The English translation is Eugenio Montale, “Fascism and 
Literature,” in The Second Life of Art: Selected Essays of Eugenio Montale, ed. and trans. Jonathan Galassi (New 
York: Ecco Press, 1982), 16. 
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VII. Offscreen space, an absence inscribed in a work’s structure of significance, can be posited 
by a statue, photograph, film, poem, or story. Some works point to what is omitted from a scene 
of representation, others thematize, reflect upon, or configure it in complex ways. Do such 
artworks bear implications for others that have no apparent concern at all for offscreen space? Is 
it not true that most works incorporate the greater bulk of their meanings within their field of 
representation? Not necessarily, and Montale’s poem helps us see why. It allows us to glean the 
consequences of Cavell’s observation that every experience of a screen is already an experience 
of displacement—a displacement that ordinary perception neutralizes, making it appear as our 
natural condition. All art removes us from the naturalized narratives of everyday life, focusing 
our attention on matters that do not concern us directly. It draws us into a theater of reflection. 
No novel meanings or understandings, no “screen experiences,” take place except within such a 
space—within and surrounding the screen, compelling us to contrast our reading of the natural-
historical scenes we have left behind with the one we have before us. It may even be that the 
more numerous the associations an artwork establishes in such a space of reception, the more 
meaningful it proves to be. Even when thoroughly engrossing and self-contained, aesthetic 
screens transmit cognitive power only by establishing a productive relation with the 
representations we are used to beholding. Even the effects of perfectly lifelike artworks prove 
significant only because they are icons, analogues, or alternatives to experience as we know it, 
referring the mind back to our lives and to the interpretive codes by which we operate. This 
places us in an offscreen space of relational reading. Over and beyond the mimetic and diegetic 
spaces of a statue, film, photograph, or literary text lies the ground of such spaces in the 
cognitive activity of art, which both creates and distinguishes, separating and bridging, on and 
offscreen space. A great interest of art lies in how it highlights and negotiates the difference 
between them. 
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